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I. INTRODUCTION 
Bigfoot on the Strip—a Branson, Missouri, Sasquatch-themed 
amusement park—left a Kansas farmer and his daughter less than 
impressed in 2018.1  Upon returning home, Mr. Randy Winchester posted 
the following three-star review on TripAdvisor: 
We did the Bigfoot Safari tour as part of a large group.  The $10 price 
tag is about right for what we got.  Basically a tour through some pretty 
rugged country on some pretty narrow roads.  They promote the fact they 
have the largest herd of Highland cows in the Midwest.  You spend about 
5–10 minutes feeding them range cubes at the beginning of the tour, and 
see maybe 10 of the cows.  Then its [sic] off into the hills you go with a 
guide telling some pretty fanciful tales along the way.  All in all a decent 
experience but had we paid more than the $10 I would have been 
disappointed.2 
After posting this review, Mr. Winchester and his daughter received 
numerous phone calls and emails from Bigfoot on the Strip complaining 
about Mr. Winchester’s criticism.3  One of these messages advised Mr. 
Winchester’s daughter that the owner would bring a lawsuit for the 
review.4  After receiving these messages, Mr. Winchester lowered his 
three-star review to one star.5  Bigfoot on the Strip subsequently filed a 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Kansas School of Law; B.A., 2018, Political Science, Fairfield 
University.  I would like to thank the Kansas Law Review editors for their rigorous edits and 
suggestions.  I would also like to give a special thank you to my friends and family for their input and 
continued support.  
 1. Bigfoot on the Strip, LLC v. Winchester, No. 18-3155-CV-S-BP, 2019 WL 4144320, at *2–
4 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 30, 2019).  
 2. Id. at *2. 
 3. Id. at *3.  
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. 
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defamation lawsuit against Mr. Winchester and his daughter.6 
Bigfoot on the Strip’s lawsuit against Mr. Winchester is the 
prototypical strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).7  
SLAPPs are (1) “based on the exercise of certain First Amendment 
petitioning rights” and (2) “unlikely to succeed on the merits.”8  SLAPPs, 
as described by the Ninth Circuit, are lawsuits “defined by a particular 
strategy: obtaining an economic advantage over a defendant, and not 
necessarily the vindication of a cognizable legal right.”9  In response to the 
rising use of SLAPP suits, many states have enacted anti-SLAPP laws to 
“root out and end frivolous cases—those brought only to harass or punish 
one’s critics—before the costs of litigation escalate and prevent a 
defendant from mounting a defense.”10  Many anti-SLAPP statutes 
accomplish this by (1) giving defendants the ability to file motions to 
dismiss or strike early in the litigation; (2) requiring expedited hearings 
for these motions and imposing a discovery stay until the motions are 
heard; (3) requiring the plaintiff to show the case has a substantial 
probability of success on the merits; and (4) imposing sanctions awarding 
attorney’s fees and costs when the plaintiff fails to meet its burden.11  
Approximately thirty states have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes that provide 
for some form of an expedited motion to dismiss.12  Because anti-SLAPP 
laws advance their substantive policy goals by imposing procedural 
requirements that may conflict with the Federal Rules, federal courts have 
struggled to determine whether anti-SLAPP laws apply in federal diversity 
cases, where federal courts must apply state substantive law and federal 
procedural law.13  A quick review of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 
12, and 56 helps focus the Erie problem that anti-SLAPP laws pose. 
Rule 8 requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Professor George W. Pring coined the term “SLAPP.”  See George W. Pring, SLAPPs: 
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 3–4 (1989). 
 8. Kathryn W. Tate, California’s Anti-SLAPP Legislation: A Summary of and Commentary on 
Its Operation and Scope, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 803 (2000) (quoting Thomas A. Waldman, 
Comment, SLAPP Suits: Weaknesses in First Amendment Law and in the Courts’ Responses to 
Frivolous Litigation, 39 UCLA L. REV. 979, 1044 (1992)). 
 9. Breazeale v. Victim Servs., Inc., 878 F.3d 759, 764 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 10. Memorandum from Lane Shetterly, Chair, Robert T. Sherwin, Reporter, & Pub. Participation 
Prot. Act Drafting Comm. to the Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 3 (June 3, 2019), 
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKe
y=341c4466-1f33-c770-7d01-012eeaa47df0&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/7LCX-WNB9] 
[hereinafter Memorandum from Shetterly].  
 11. Id.  
 12. State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://anti-slapp.org/your-states 
-free-speech-protection [https://perma.cc/V7FD-ZER3] (last visited Apr. 7, 2020) [hereinafter 
Project] (listing states that have enacted anti-SLAPP laws and rating them based on quality). 
 13. See infra Section II.C. 
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of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”14  The Supreme 
Court has established that Rule 8 requires complaints to “contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face.’”15  If a complaint fails to meet this standard, the district court 
may grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.”16  Finally, Rule 56 governs 
motions for summary judgment.17  Rule 56 allows summary judgment 
when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,”18 and is therefore “appropriate 
only when the plaintiff has been able to come up with no evidence that 
would allow a reasonable jury to find in her favor.”19 
Courts often struggle when considering whether the state anti-SLAPP 
statutes can coexist with the pleading and pretrial judgment standards laid 
out in Federal Rules 8, 12, and 56.  The federal appellate courts are split 
as to whether anti-SLAPP statutes are procedural, and thus conflict with 
the Federal Rules, or whether they are substantive, and therefore can work 
together to dismiss SLAPPs brought in federal court at an early stage.20  
The sole case from the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas 
addressing the applicability of Kansas’s anti-SLAPP statute in federal 
court21 lacks the depth of the well-developed Ninth Circuit case law.22  As 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas continues to develop its 
approach on this issue, it should follow the Ninth Circuit’s recent efforts 
to circumscribe select provisions of anti-SLAPP statutes in federal 
diversity actions, while preserving the substantive provisions, because this 
approach best aligns with the purposes of the Erie doctrine. 
Part II of this Comment provides a comprehensive background of the 
development of anti-SLAPP legislation, an introduction to the Kansas 
 
 14. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 15. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007)). 
 16. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 17. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 18. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 19. Jonah B. Gelbah, Material Facts in the Debate Over Twombly and Iqbal, 68 STAN. L. REV. 
369, 381–82, 382 n.41 (2016) (“Note that ‘no evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find in 
her favor’ is not the same thing as no evidence at all.  It is not sufficient for a plaintiff to come up with 
a mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence, because courts impose a burden of production on parties that requires 
some minimal level of evidence that is more than simply a shred.” (quoting Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986))). 
 20. See infra Section II.C. 
 21. Caranchini v. Peck, 355 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (D. Kan. 2018). 
 22. See United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 970–
73 (9th Cir. 1999); Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 837–40 (9th Cir. 2001); Makaeff 
v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 260–65 (9th Cir. 2013); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. 
v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 832–35 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1446 (2019). 
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anti-SLAPP statute, an overview of the current circuit split, a history of 
the Ninth Circuit’s case law, and an introduction to the sole case 
addressing the applicability of Kansas’s anti-SLAPP statute in federal 
diversity actions.  Part III analyzes how the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Kansas—and ultimately the Tenth Circuit—might adopt the 
reasoning from Ninth Circuit case law to protect the integrity of the anti-
SLAPP provisions while not running afoul of the Erie doctrine.  Part IV 
concludes by confronting common objections and proffering how the use 
of the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute may affect future litigation in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Kansas. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This Part outlines the origins of anti-SLAPP legislation and introduces 
the language of the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute.  It then explains the root 
of the current controversy by examining the Erie progeny and evaluates 
why these decisions have led to a circuit split regarding the applicability 
of anti-SLAPP statutes in federal courts.  Finally, this Part looks at the 
Ninth Circuit’s body of case law addressing this issue, and the sole case 
addressing the applicability of the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute in federal 
diversity actions. 
A. Origins of Anti-SLAPP Legislation 
SLAPPs are generally meritless lawsuits that are brought against 
individuals for exercising certain First Amendment petitioning rights in an 
attempt to chill free speech.23  Anti-SLAPP statutes seek to combat these 
meritless lawsuits by establishing “a special motion to dismiss procedure, 
with little or no discovery, that can quickly dispose” of such lawsuits.24  
These statutes are of great benefit to defendants because eighty to ninety 
percent of SLAPP plaintiffs do not prevail at trial.25  Since the early 1990s, 
approximately thirty states have enacted anti-SLAPP legislation26 in an 
effort to protect their citizens from large private interests that seek to 
 
 23. Tate, supra note 8, at 802–03. 
 24. Cliff Zatz et al., What’s Next for Federal Anti-SLAPP Legislation, LAW360 (Apr. 19, 2017, 
12:21 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/914702/what-s-next-for-federal-anti-slapp-legislation; 
see also Jay Adkisson, Anti-SLAPP Statutory Oddities, FORBES (Oct. 31, 2017, 8:01 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2017/10/31/anti-slapp-statutory-oddities/#7b14777f2037 
[https://perma.cc/G34Y-RFEQ] (“Litigators should think of an Anti-SLAPP motion as something akin 
to a ‘motion to dismiss on steroids.’”). 
 25. Tate, supra note 8, at 804 (citing John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to 
the Problem of SLAPPs, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395, 406 (1993)).  
 26. Project, supra note 12.  
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“deter common citizens from exercising their political or legal rights or to 
punish them for doing so.”27 
SLAPPs can be brought by or against any litigant, but they tend to 
share common trends.  They are usually filed by government officials or 
businesses against individuals who openly oppose them on issues of public 
interest.28  These individuals are usually people with fewer resources who 
lack the time and money to defend a lawsuit.29  SLAPPs commonly result 
from actions such as submitting letters to the editor, distributing flyers or 
petitions, engaging in demonstrations, speaking at public hearings, and 
filing lawsuits.30  Although the types of claims brought in SLAPPs can be 
widespread, they too are marked by many shared characteristics.  They 
generally come in the form of ordinary civil claims, with defamation being 
one of the most common.31  SLAPPs “are most often provoked by: 
[p]articipation at public hearings (47%); [f]iling public interest litigation 
(20%); [r]eporting violations of laws or regulations (18%); [l]odging 
formal government complaints (8%); or [p]eaceful protests and legal 
boycotts (3%).”32  The increase in the use of SLAPPs prompted many 
states legislatures to enact statutes allowing defendants to bring a special 
motion to dismiss at an early stage in the litigation.33 
Generally, anti-SLAPP statutes share two key features: (1) “they 
provide an expedited procedure to short-circuit SLAPPs, conserving all 
parties’ time and resources,” and (2) they award defendants who win the 
motion to dismiss attorney’s fees and costs.34  Despite these similarities, 
however, state legislatures often adopt varying approaches, and state anti-
SLAPP statutes are not a “one-size-fits-all model.”35  Delaware’s anti-
SLAPP statute, for example, only covers suits arising from government 
permits and various licensing issues,36 while Pennsylvania’s anti-SLAPP 
 
 27. GOLO, LLC v. Higher Health Network, LLC, No. 3:18-cv-2434, 2019 WL 446251, at *5 
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2019) (quoting Wilcox v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 450 (1994)).  
 28. What Is a SLAPP Suit?, ACLU OHIO, https://www.acluohio.org/slapped/what-is-a-slapp-suit 
[https://perma.cc/XC9N-G4BV] (last visited Apr. 7, 2020). 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Memorandum from Shetterly, supra note 10, at 2–3. 
 34. Sean D. Lee, “I Hate My Doctor”: Reputation, Defamation, and Physician-Review Websites, 
23 HEALTH MATRIX 573, 591 (2013); see also Project, supra note 12.  Most states with anti-SLAPP 
statutes provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees.  Project, supra note 12.  Delaware, Maine, 
Maryland, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, Utah, and Virginia are the few states that do not.  Id. 
 35. Zatz et al., supra note 24 (citations omitted).  
 36. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8136(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through ch. 239 of 150th Gen. 
Assemb.). 
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statute only covers suits that arise from environmental issues.37  California 
has one of the broadest anti-SLAPP statutes—it applies to any case 
resulting from an individual’s exercise of their right to petition and free 
speech.38  Other state statutes include some colorful variations.  For 
example, Arizona’s statute encourages successful SLAPP defendants to 
seek additional sanctions,39 which likely include sanctions against the 
plaintiff as well as the attorney who filed the SLAPP.40  Hawaii’s statute 
gives the court explicit authority to impose sanctions on the plaintiff, its 
attorney, and even the law firms.41  Despite the many variations among 
state anti-SLAPP statutes, they are all designed to “protect[] citizens from 
[the] David and Goliath power difference.”42 
B. The Kansas Anti-SLAPP Statute 
In 2016, Kansas enacted its anti-SLAPP statute, the Kansas Public 
Speech Protection Act.43  The statute’s provisions are representative of 
many other state anti-SLAPP statutes.44  The Act’s stated purpose “is to 
encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of a person to petition, 
and speak freely and associate freely, in connection with a public issue or 
issue of public interest . . . while, at the same time, protecting the rights of 
a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.”45  The 
Kansas statute, like many of its kind, protects speech relating to a “public 
issue or issue of public interest.”46  The statute defines this as anything 
related to “[h]ealth or safety,” “environmental, economic or community 
well-being,” “the government,” “a public official or public figure,” or “a 
good, product or service in the marketplace.”47 
Procedurally, once a SLAPP is brought, the defendant can move to 
dismiss because it implicates the exercise of their right to assemble, 
petition, or speak freely.48  The Kansas statute provides a burden-shifting 
test: while the defendant bears the initial burden of showing the claim 
 
 37. 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7707, 8301–8305 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.). 
 38. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (Deering 2019).  
 39. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-752(B) (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess.). 
 40. Adkisson, supra note 24. 
 41. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634F-2(8)(C) (West, Westlaw through end of 2019 Reg. Sess.). 
 42. Lori A. Roberts, Brawling with the Consumer Review Site Bully, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 633, 658 
(2016) (quoting Stuborn Ltd. P’ship v. Bernstein, 245 F. Supp. 2d 312, 314 (D. Mass. 2003)).  
 43. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5320 (West 2016 & Supp. 2019).   
 44. See supra Section II.A. 
 45. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5320(b). 
 46. Id. § 60-5320(c)(4). 
 47. Id. § 60-5320(c)(7)(A)–(E). 
 48. Id. § 60-5320(d). 
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“concerns a party’s exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition or 
right of association,” once shown, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to 
demonstrate “a likelihood of prevailing on the claim by presenting 
substantial competent evidence to support a prima facie case.”49  If the 
defendant prevails and the court strikes the claim, the defendant is entitled 
to recover litigation costs and attorney’s fees from the plaintiff.50 
C. The Controversy 
There is no federal anti-SLAPP statute.  Because state anti-SLAPP 
statutes have both procedural and substantive elements, federal courts 
disagree as to whether state anti-SLAPP statutes apply in federal diversity 
actions, where federal courts must apply state substantive law and federal 
procedural law.51  Those who oppose application of anti-SLAPP statutes 
in federal court generally view anti-SLAPP statutes as purely procedural 
instruments.52  Anti-SLAPP laws, however, employ procedural means to 
achieve substantive results.53  From this perspective, “it is impossible to 
characterize them as purely procedural,” and state anti-SLAPP statutes 
should therefore apply in federal court.54  This Section provides an 
overview of the Erie doctrine, explains why the Erie progeny presents a 
roadblock in applying state anti-SLAPP statutes in federal court, and 
discusses the deepening circuit split in the wake of more recent Erie cases. 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. § 60-5320(g). 
 51. Compare Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding 
that federal courts “exercising diversity jurisdiction . . . must apply Federal Rules 12 and 56 instead of 
the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act’s special motion to dismiss provision” because the Federal Rules “answer 
the same question” as the D.C. Anti-SLAPP statute), and Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 
F.3d 1345, 1356–57 (11th Cir. 2018) (determining that the motion-to-strike provision in Georgia’s 
anti-SLAPP statute directly conflicts with the Federal Rules), with United States ex rel. Newsham v. 
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that California’s anti-
SLAPP statute applies in federal diversity actions because there is no “direct collision” between the 
statute and the Federal Rules).  
 52. Roni A. Elias, Applying Anti-SLAPP Laws in Diversity Cases: How to Protect the Substantive 
Public Interest in State Procedural Rules, 41 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 215, 216 (2016) (“The argument 
against applying state anti-SLAPP statutes in federal diversity cases is persuasive if those statutes are 
understood as entirely, or even predominantly, procedural.  The courts challenging the federal 
application of state anti-SLAPP statutes have this understanding, interpreting those statutes as giving 
private litigants a collection of special procedural instruments for defending or asserting their private 
rights.”). 
 53. Id. (arguing that anti-SLAPP laws should be “understood as using procedural means to 
accomplish a substantive end”). 
 54. Id. 
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1. The Erie Doctrine 
The Erie doctrine guides a federal court’s decision on whether to apply 
state law in a federal diversity action.55  Erie requires that “federal courts 
sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural 
law.”56  Characterizing a law as either “substantive” or “procedural” is 
often no easy task,57 however, and requires working through the 
complexities and uncertainties of the contemporary Erie doctrine.58  The 
1938 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins decision spurred a long line of 
subsequent cases attempting to navigate the complexities left open in the 
opinion.59  Erie and its progeny have been the subject of scholarly debate 
for decades,60 and this Comment does not attempt to examine its intricate 
nuances.  As Professor John Corr acknowledged, “[t]he difficulties of 
mastering the application of Erie are well known to those who study it” 
and “[t]he superficial simplicity of a rule sometimes requiring federal 
courts to apply state law becomes, on closer examination, a swamp of 
confusion that can trap everyone from legal neophytes to the most astute 
of federal judges.”61  An abbreviated discussion of the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decisions on this question is nonetheless warranted to 
understand the difficulty of determining whether state anti-SLAPP statutes 
are procedural or substantive for Erie purposes. 
After Erie, the Court in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York continued to 
command that federal courts respect state law.62  The Guaranty Trust 
 
 55. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Colin Quinlan, Note, Erie and 
the First Amendment: State Anti-SLAPP Laws in Federal Court After Shady Grove, 114 COLUM. L. 
REV. 367, 377–79 (2014) (“When federal courts adjudicate claims arising under state law, they look 
to the Erie doctrine to determine which state laws they must apply.”).  
 56. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). 
 57. Id. (“Classification of a law as ‘substantive’ or ‘procedural’ for Erie purposes is sometimes a 
challenging endeavor.”). 
 58. Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the 
Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 251 (2008); see also 
Richard D. Freer, Erie’s Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087, 1101–02 (1989) (“Erie . . . gave 
birth . . . to a jurisprudence of labels that has since haunted the federal courts. . . .  The ensuing fifty 
years . . . have demonstrated the difficulty of distinguishing substance from procedure in less clear-
cut cases.”). 
 59. See, e.g., Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 
Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 
Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996). 
 60. See Steinman, supra note 58, at 247 (“Erie has achieved a mythic status, and it has been a 
constant subject of scholarly debate and analysis.”). 
 61. John B. Corr, Thoughts on the Vitality of Erie, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1087, 1089 (1992).  
 62. 326 U.S. 99 (1945); see Daniel R. Gordon, Revisiting Erie, Guaranty Trust, and Gasperini: 
The Role of Jewish Social History in Fashioning Modern American Federalism, 26 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 213, 226 (2002) (“In Erie and Guaranty Trust, the Justices applied state law and emphasized the 
importance of state government, legislatures, and courts.”).  
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Court was tasked with resolving whether a statute of limitation was 
substantive or procedural.63  The Court determined that Erie sought to 
ensure that “the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be 
substantially the same . . . as it would be if tried in a State court.”64  Thus, 
the Court found that failing to apply a substantive state law in a federal 
diversity action would substantially affect the case outcome, but if a state 
law were purely procedural, it would only regulate how a right is enforced, 
and not materially affect the outcome of the litigation.65  The Court found 
that a statute of limitation is outcome-determinative, and therefore 
substantive for Erie purposes, because it can place a complete bar on 
recovery.66 
Although the Court initially seemed inclined to favor application of 
state law, however, it subsequently changed course in its 1958 Byrd v. Blue 
Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. decision.67  The Byrd Court 
assessed whether a federal court sitting in diversity must apply South 
Carolina law requiring that a judge, rather than a jury, determine if a 
plaintiff is a statutory employee, and thus limited to recovery under South 
Carolina’s workers’ compensation law.68  Justice Brennan, writing for the 
Court, held that federal courts must follow the federal practice of jury 
determination.69  In resolving the issue, the Byrd Court proffered a 
balancing test for traditionally “procedural” areas that defer to the state 
law if it is “bound-up with [state-based] rights and obligations.”70  In 
situations where the state rule is not bound-up with state-based rights and 
obligations, the federal rule is preferred.71  The Byrd balancing test proved 
difficult to apply in practice, and perhaps it was in part this difficulty that 
caused the Supreme Court to make a radical shift in Hanna v. Plumer.72 
The question before the Court in Hanna was whether Federal Rule 4 
 
 63. Guar. Tr. Co., 326 U.S. at 107.   
 64. Id. at 109.  
 65. Id. at 110–11.   
 66. Id. at 111–12. 
 67. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
 68. Id. at 533–34.  
 69. Id. at 538. 
 70. Id. at 538–39.  
 71. Id. at 537.  
 72. Michael A. Berch & Rebecca White Berch, An Essay Regarding Gasperini v. Center for 
Humanities, Inc. and the Demise of the Uniform Application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
69 MISS. L.J. 715, 722 (1999); see also J. Benjamin King, Note, Clarification and Disruption: The 
Effect of Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. on the Erie Doctrine, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 161, 170 
(1997) (“Byrd complicated the analysis because ‘it provides ambiguous guidance as to when—aside 
from the precise circumstances present in the Byrd case—federal rules will prevail in the face of 
contrary state rules.’” (quoting 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4504 (2d ed. 1996)). 
800 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
or a contrary state rule governed service of process in a state personal 
injury action.73  The Court explained that “when a situation is covered by 
one of the Federal Rules, the question facing the court is a far cry from the 
typical, relatively unguided Erie choice.”74  Where the Federal Rules are 
at issue, the Court announced, the Rules Enabling Act (REA)75 is the 
focus, and a federal court may “refuse to [apply a Federal Rule] only if the 
Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie 
judgment that the Rule” does not violate the REA or constitutional 
restrictions.76  The Court thus held that Federal Rule 4, not the conflicting 
state rule, governed the sufficiency of service.77  The Hanna Court, as one 
author put it, “enshrined a bifurcated approach to Erie questions.”78  
Professor Richard Freer described the two separate inquiries at work in 
Hanna: 
First, if Congress has directed the federal courts to apply a particular rule, 
and if that command is constitutional, the federal law applies.  There is 
no concern with outcome determination, balancing, or any other Erie test 
because the Rules of Decision Act does not apply.  Second, if there is no 
congressional direction to apply federal law, such as the Federal Rules, 
the court must assess the case under the Rules of Decision Act.  The 
tribunal is then left with “the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice.”79 
The Hanna Court seemed to retreat from Byrd’s balancing test and 
preferred applying the federal law in situations not covered by a rule 
adopted pursuant to the REA.80  And, Hanna modified Guaranty Trust’s 
outcome-determinative test by stressing Erie’s twin aims and providing 
that when considering whether the competing state and federal rules will 
result in a different outcome, courts must make this determination from 
the point of view of a plaintiff choosing where to file their case.81 
 
 73. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 461 (1965).  
 74. Id. at 471. 
 75. The REA gives the Supreme Court authority to create “general rules of practice and 
procedure” in civil suits, but states that “[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.”  28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018). 
 76. Freer, supra note 58, at 1104 (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471).  
 77. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463–64.  
 78. Steinman, supra note 58, at 260. 
 79. Freer, supra note 58, at 1104–05 (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1652 
(2018) (mandating that substantive state law be applied in state cases, unless the United States 
Constitution, Treaties of the United States, or Congress says otherwise). 
 80. Berch & Berch, supra note 72, at 723–24.  The Court expressed this preference for application 
of the federal rules “unless it would encourage forum shopping or foster the inequitable administration 
of the laws,” though “[l]ater cases attempted to hew to this line of reasoning.”  Id. 
 81. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469 (“Though choice of the federal or state rule will at this point have 
a marked effect upon the outcome of the litigation, the difference between the two rules would be of 
scant, if any, relevance to the choice of a forum.”). 
2020] GETTING SLAPP HAPPY 801 
Several decades later, the Court decided Gasperini v. Center for 
Humanities, Inc., which involved the Seventh Amendment right to trial by 
jury and a New York law governing appellate review of jury verdicts.82  In 
Gasperini, a journalist brought suit in federal court based on diversity 
jurisdiction seeking damages for the defendant’s loss of photographic 
transparencies of pictures he took in Central America.83  The jury awarded 
the plaintiff $450,000 in damages.84  The defendant moved for a new trial 
under Rule 59, arguing that the $450,000 verdict was excessive.85  The 
trial court denied the motion, and on appeal, the Second Circuit vacated 
the jury’s verdict and ordered a new trial.86  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari because the case posed a difficult Erie question about what 
standard a federal district court must use to “measure the alleged 
excessiveness of a jury’s verdict” in a state law action.87 
While Federal Rule 59(a)(1) permits motions for a new trial “for any 
of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions 
at law in the courts of the United States,” Rule 59 does not provide any 
standard to examine an excessive verdict.88  Federal courts in New York 
traditionally employ the “shock the conscience” standard to decide 
whether to order a new trial.89  The conflict in Gasperini arose from the 
tension between the federal “shock the conscience” standard and a New 
York tort reform law that required New York state courts to inquire 
whether the verdict “deviates materially from what would be reasonable 
compensation.”90 
One of the Erie issues that the Gasperini Court confronted was 
whether federal judges faced with a new trial motion should apply the state 
or federal sufficiency of the evidence standard when determining if a 
jury’s damages award was excessive.91  The defendant contended that the 
New York law was substantive, and plaintiff argued that it was procedural, 
and that if it were to apply, it would violate both the jury’s right to establish 
damages and the Seventh Amendment’s reexamination clause.92  Justice 
Ginsburg, writing for the Court, found that the New York law was both 
 
 82. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).  
 83. Id. at 419.  
 84. Id. at 420.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 422.  
 88. Id. at 433 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)). 
 89. Id. at 422. 
 90. Id. at 418–19. 
 91. King, supra note 72, at 163. 
 92. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426. 
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substantive and procedural for Erie purposes.93  The Court held that to 
serve the “twin aims” of Erie recognized in Hanna—preventing forum 
shopping and inequitable administration of the laws—the more “rigorous” 
state standard must apply.94 
The Court’s accommodation of the state standard marked a shift 
towards giving heightened deference to state law by allowing state law to 
define the substance of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.95  Gasperini’s 
holding was significant to the Erie doctrine because it added that even 
when a Federal Rule may be broad enough to control, the Federal Rule’s 
application may still, at least implicitly, require application of the 
underlying state laws.96  And, Gasperini “confirmed Byrd’s place in the 
Erie analysis because the Court explicitly engaged in a Byrd balancing 
test” by examining if there were any countervailing federal interests 
outweighing the state interest in applying the New York standard.97  Thus, 
Gasperini stands to allow state procedure to “displace federal procedure 
within the scope of a Federal Rule.”98  The Court, in dicta, also noted the 
importance of interpreting Federal Rules “with sensitivity to important 
state interests and regulatory policies.”99 
Armed with this understanding, the unique Erie issue posed by state 
anti-SLAPP laws becomes clear.100  The majority of anti-SLAPP statutes 
“rely on procedural mechanisms to protect substantive rights.”101  This 
makes it difficult for federal courts sitting in diversity, because under the 
Erie doctrine, federal courts must apply state substantive law, but all civil 
proceedings in federal court require application of the Federal Rules.102  
Anti-SLAPP laws tend to raise questions about Federal Rule 12(b)(6) 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 428–30. 
 95. See King, supra note 72, at 183. 
 96. Benjamin Grossberg, Comment, Uniformity, Federalism, and Tort Reform: The Erie 
Implications of Medical Malpractice Certificate of Merit Statutes, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 239 (2010). 
 97. King, supra note 72, at 183–84. 
 98. Id. at 183. 
 99. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 n.7.  After this analysis, the Court also considered whether the 
Seventh Amendment’s limit of appellate review precluded the application of state law. 
 100. See Caranchini v. Peck, 355 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1058 (D. Kan. 2018) (“Courts deciding 
whether these anti-SLAPP statutes apply in federal court agree that the issue falls into the ‘special 
category concerning the relationship between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and a state statute 
that governs both procedures and substance in the state courts,’ which is not the ‘classic Erie 
question.’” (quoting Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 86 (1st Cir. 2010))). 
 101. Quinlan, supra note 55, at 368. 
 102. See, e.g., Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 428 (“Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in 
diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.”); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 
P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“The framework for our 
decision is familiar.  We must first determine whether [the Federal Rule] answers the question in 
dispute.  If it does, it governs . . . .”). 
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motions to dismiss and Federal Rule 56 summary judgment motions 
because they appear to conflict with state anti-SLAPP statutes that “set 
their own threshold a claimant must meet to proceed with their case.”103 
This apparent tension between the Federal Rules and state anti-SLAPP 
statutes further grew after the Supreme Court decided Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co. in 2010.104  In Shady 
Grove, a New York statute required the defendant, Allstate, to pay interest 
on Shady Grove’s insurance claim.105  When Allstate refused to pay, the 
plaintiff filed a diversity action in the Eastern District of New York, and 
later filed a Rule 23 motion to certify a class action.106  But, a New York 
law prohibited class actions from being formed for the purpose of 
collecting this kind of statutory interest.107  A splintered Court discussed a 
number of potential routes for settling a conflict between the Federal Rule 
and the New York law.108  But five Justices “agreed that a state law could 
be ‘procedural’ and yet so important in defining the scope of substantive 
rights that the Federal Rules could not displace it.”109 
Nevertheless, Shady Grove failed to provide a clear answer.  The three 
opinions—Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, Justice Stevens’s 
concurrence, and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent—have caused lower federal 
courts to disagree about which parts of Shady Grove control.110  Justice 
Scalia argued that when a Federal Rule “regulates procedure,” it is “valid 
in all jurisdictions, with respect to all claims, regardless of its incidental 
 
 103. Aaron Smith, Note, SLAPP Fight, 68 ALA. L. REV. 303, 311 (2016). 
 104. 559 U.S. 393 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
 105. Id. at 397.  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 416 (finding Federal Rule 23 directly applicable because “[t]he short of the matter is 
that a Federal Rule governing procedure is valid whether or not it alters the outcome of the case in a 
way that induces forum shopping”); id. at 416–17 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I agree with Justice Scalia 
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 must apply in this case . . . .  But I also agree with Justice 
Ginsburg that there are some state procedural rules that federal courts must apply in diversity cases 
because they function as a part of the State’s definition of substantive rights and remedies.”); id. at 
447, 456 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding that narrowly construing Rule 23 allows for application of 
the state law, and asserting that “forum shopping will undoubtedly result if a plaintiff need only file 
in federal instead of state court to seek a massive monetary award explicitly barred by state law”).  
 109. Quinlan, supra note 55, at 368.  
 110. Compare 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 95 n.7 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Although some 
other courts may rely on Justice Stevens’ concurrence in Shady Grove for determining the first 
question (i.e., whether the federal rules cover the dispute at issue or answer the same question as the 
state law), this Court believes that the analysis set forth in Part II-A of Shady Grove is the controlling 
test that district courts must apply.”), with In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 756 F. Supp. 2d 670, 
675 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (finding that Justice Stevens’ Shady Grove analysis is binding because it forms 
the “narrowest grounds” in Shady Grove, and collecting cases where lower courts have concluded the 
same).  
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effect upon state-created rights.”111  Justice Stevens argued that a Federal 
Rule “cannot govern” a case where “the rule would displace a state law 
that is procedural in the ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined with 
a state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-
created right,” and that “absent a governing federal rule, a federal court 
must engage in the traditional Rules of Decision Act inquiry, under the 
Erie line of cases.”112  In dissent, Justice Ginsburg wrote that had the Court 
first evaluated if the conflict was “really necessary,” the Court would not 
have read the Federal Rule to collide with the state’s legitimate interest, 
because Federal “Rule 23 describes a method of enforcing a claim for 
relief, while the state law defines the dimensions of the claim itself.”113 
Next, this Section discusses the well-developed circuit split and 
addresses how courts have used the Erie doctrine to either support or 
refuse application of state anti-SLAPP statutes in federal diversity actions. 
2. The Circuit Split 
The D.C., Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that certain anti-
SLAPP laws do not apply in federal court,114 whereas the First and Ninth 
Circuits find that certain state anti-SLAPP laws may apply in federal 
court.115  The Fifth Circuit has ruled both ways depending on the content 
of the state anti-SLAPP law before the court.116  These decisions, as 
demonstrated by the Fifth Circuit, are partly a result of the particular 
language of the state statute at issue.  Many of the discrepancies, however, 
also result from the lack of guidance from Shady Grove.117  The clearest 
example of diverging outcomes resulting from the lack of clarity in Shady 
Grove is the First Circuit’s Godin v. Schencks118 and the D.C. Circuit’s 
 
 111. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 410. 
 112. Id. at 423–24 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 113. Id. at 437, 447 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 114. Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Intercon Sols., 
Inc. v. Basel Action Network, 791 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 2015); Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC 
v. AmeriCulture, Inc., 885 F.3d 659, 673 (10th Cir. 2018); Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 
F.3d 1345, 1347 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 115. Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 91–92 (1st Cir. 2010); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., 
Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 835 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1446 (2019). 
 116. Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 245 (5th Cir. 2019) (declining to apply the Texas anti-
SLAPP statute because its “burden-shifting framework imposes additional requirements beyond those 
found in [Federal] Rules 12 and 56 and answers the same question as those rules”); Lozovyy v. Kurtz, 
813 F.3d 576, 582–83 (5th Cir. 2015) (deciding to apply the Louisiana anti-SLAPP statute in federal 
court).  
 117. Katelyn E. Saner, Note, Getting SLAPP-ed in Federal Court: Applying State Anti-SLAPP 
Special Motions to Dismiss in Federal Court After Shady Grove, 63 DUKE L.J. 781, 801–02 (2013); 
Quinlan, supra note 55, at 368–69. 
 118. 629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010). 
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Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group, LLC119 opinions.  Though the two courts 
were presented with the same legal question regarding a strikingly similar 
state law, the courts’ interpretations of Shady Grove led to two diverging 
outcomes. 
The special motion to dismiss provisions of the Maine and District of 
Columbia anti-SLAPP statutes were at issue in Godin120 and Abbas,121 
respectfully.  Both statutes are broad—they apply to statements made 
about any issues of public interest, safeguard an individual’s right to 
petition, and prevent the heavy legal burdens that SLAPP suits place on 
defendants.122  Once a SLAPP defendant files the special motion, the court 
prioritizes the motion.123  An automatic stay freezes discovery unless the 
plaintiff can show good cause and that allowing limited discovery would 
not be unduly burdensome.124  Both statutes require the court to first 
determine whether the asserted claim is based on the defendant’s 
petitioning rights.125  The Maine statute provides that the court will grant 
the motion unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant’s 
exercise of its petitioning right “was devoid of any reasonable factual 
support or any arguable basis in law” and that the plaintiff was actually 
injured by the defendant’s acts.126  The District of Columbia statute states 
that the court should grant the motion unless the plaintiff can demonstrate 
a likelihood of prevailing on the merits.127  Despite the similarities, the 
First Circuit and D.C. Circuit reached differing conclusions as to the 
applicability of the statutes.128 
The First Circuit in Godin found that Rules 12 and 56 do not 
 
 119. 783 F.3d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  
 120. See 629 F.3d at 81–82. 
 121. See 783 F.3d at 1332. 
 122. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502 (West, Westlaw through Mar. 2019); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 14, § 556 (Westlaw through ch. 676 of 2019 2d Reg. Sess.).  
 123. The District of Columbia law requires the court to give the special motion priority over other 
cases.  See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502(d) (“The court shall hold an expedited hearing on the special 
motion to dismiss, and issue a ruling as soon as practicable after the hearing.”).  Unlike the District of 
Columbia law, the Maine law provides the court with discretion over this matter.  See ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (“The special motion may be advanced on the docket and receive priority over 
other cases when the court determines that the interests of justice so require.”). 
 124. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502(c); 14 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556.  
 125. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502(b); 14 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556.  
 126. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556.  
 127. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502(b).  Note that the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute states that the court 
must grant the special motion unless the plaintiff can establish a “likelihood of prevailing on the claim 
by presenting substantial competent evidence to support a prima facie case.”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
5320(d) (West 2016 & Supp. 2019). 
 128. See Godin v. Schnecks, 629 F.3d 79, 81 (1st Cir. 2010) (applying the Maine anti-SLAPP 
statute); Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (recognizing that 
the court must follow the Federal Rules instead of the D.C. anti-SLAPP statute, but affirming on 
alternate grounds). 
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“attempt[] to answer the same question” as Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute.129  
The court seemed to follow the reasoning in Justice Ginsburg’s Shady 
Grove dissent instead of the approaches expressed by Justice Scalia or 
Justice Stevens.130  The First Circuit interpreted Rules 12 and 56 narrowly 
to avoid conflict with the Maine anti-SLAPP law, just as Justice Ginsburg 
narrowly read Rule 23 in Shady Grove.131  The court first assessed whether 
the state law and Federal Rules 12 and 56 can comfortably coexist, or 
whether the Federal Rules at issue were intended to “occupy the field.”132  
A Federal Rule must be applied over a state law if evidence suggests that 
the Federal Rule was intended to “occupy the field.”133  Godin held that 
Rules 12 and 56 were not broad enough to cover the specific issue 
presented in Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute.134  Unlike Rules 12 and 56, 
Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute did not address “general federal procedures” 
that govern a wide category of cases, but rather “only addressed [] special 
procedures for state claims based on a defendant’s petitioning activity.”135  
Maine’s statute was thus “not created [to] substitute” any of the Federal 
Rules.136  Rather, Maine “created a supplemental and substantive rule to 
provide added protections” to SLAPP defendants sued for exercising their 
constitutional right to participate in petitioning activities.137  The court also 
pointed out that the anti-SLAPP statute created a substantive burden-
shifting provision, while Rules 12 and 56 are silent as to which party bears 
the burden of proof.138  These considerations led the First Circuit to find 
that Federal Rules 12 and 56 “can exist side by side” with the Maine anti-
SLAPP statute, “each controlling its own intended sphere of coverage 
without conflict.”139 
 
 129. Godin, 629 F.3d at 87–88 (alteration in original) (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 
P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 399 (2010) (plurality opinion)) (“Maine has not created a 
substitute to the Federal Rules, but instead created a supplemental and substantive rule to provide 
added protections, beyond those in Rules 12 and 56, to defendants who are named as parties because 
of constitutional petitioning activities.”). 
 130. Saner, supra note 117, at 802–03.  As Katelyn Saner noted, the First Circuit did not explicitly 
cite to Justice Ginsburg’s Shady Grove dissent, but it followed her analysis by sharing her reluctance 
to find unnecessary conflict between federal and state laws, and by “look[ing] to past cases and history 
in finding no conflict.”  Id. at 802 n.157 (citing Godin, 629 F.3d at 86, 88).  
 131. Id. at 803; see Godin, 629 F.3d at 89–90.   
 132. Godin, 629 F.3d at 91 (quoting United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space 
Co., 190 F.3d at 963, 972 (9th Cir. 1999)).  
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 88. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 89.  
 139. Id. at 91 (quoting United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 
F.3d at 963, 972 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
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Five years after Godin, the D.C. Circuit in Abbas reached the opposite 
conclusion and held that “[a] federal court exercising diversity 
jurisdiction . . . must apply Federal Rules 12 and 56 instead of the D.C. 
Anti-SLAPP Act’s special motion to dismiss provision.”140  The D.C. 
Circuit reached this conclusion in part by finding that Rules 12 and 56 
“establish the standards for granting pretrial judgment” in federal court.141  
And, since the court found that Federal Rules 12 and 56 “answer the same 
question” as the D.C. anti-SLAPP statute, the court concluded that the two 
standards conflict with one another.142  Specifically, the Abbas court found 
that the D.C. anti-SLAPP statute “establishes the circumstances under 
which a court must dismiss a plaintiff’s claim before trial—namely, when 
the court concludes that the plaintiff does not have a likelihood of success 
on the merits.”143  But Federal Rules 12 and 56, which also answer this 
question, do not impose any requirement that a plaintiff show a likelihood 
of success on the merits.144  The court concluded that the D.C. anti-SLAPP 
statute’s “likelihood of success standard is different from and more 
difficult for plaintiffs to meet than the standards imposed by Federal Rules 
12 and 56.”145  Thus, the D.C. Circuit declined to apply the D.C. anti-
SLAPP statute in federal diversity actions.146 
The diverging outcomes in Godin and Abbas exemplify the difficulties 
courts have faced in the wake of Shady Grove.  However, the complexities 
left open in Shady Grove are not the sole reason for the disagreements 
among the circuit courts.  The outcomes of anti-SLAPP motions in federal 
court also frequently turn on the particular language of the state statute.  
Although a circuit may resolve the applicability of one state’s statute, this 
still leaves open questions about how the circuit may apply another state’s 
statute.147 
 
 140. Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 141. Id. at 1333. 
 142. Id. at 1333–34.  
 143. Id. at 1333. 
 144. Id. at 1333–34. 
 145. Id. at 1335. 
 146. Id. at 1332.  Other courts have reached similar outcomes.  See, e.g., Carbone v. Cable News 
Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1356–57 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that Georgia’s anti-SLAPP motion-
to-strike provision conflicted with the Federal Rules because the provision was a purely procedural 
mechanism); Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 245 (5th Cir. 2019) (declining to apply the Texas anti-
SLAPP statute in federal court because it answers the same questions as Federal Rules 12 and 56); 
Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v. Americulture, Inc., 885 F.3d 659, 673 (10th Cir. 2018) (refusing 
to apply the New Mexico anti-SLAPP statute in federal court because it “simply does not define the 
scope of any state substantive right or remedy”). 
 147. For example, in Intercon Solutions, Inc. v. Basel Action Network, the Seventh Circuit agreed 
with a district court’s decision that the Washington anti-SLAPP statute was incompatible with the 
Federal Rules.  791 F.3d 729, 730 (7th Cir. 2015).  However, the court recognized that “[t]his circuit’s 
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The Tenth Circuit provides a clear example of where a circuit court 
determines the applicability of one state anti-SLAPP statute, but leaves 
unanswered the applicability of another state’s anti-SLAPP law.  In 2018, 
the Tenth Circuit held in Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v. 
AmeriCulture, Inc. that the New Mexico anti-SLAPP statute did not apply 
in federal court.148  However, later that year in Caranchini v. Peck, the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas determined that Los Lobos 
was not binding precedent because the Tenth Circuit’s finding was specific 
to the New Mexico statute.149  There, the court found that the Kansas anti-
SLAPP statute did apply in federal court.150  The distinction turned on the 
narrow language of the New Mexico statute, which provides: 
Any action seeking money damages against a person for conduct or 
speech undertaken or made in connection with a public hearing or public 
meeting in a quasi-judicial proceeding . . . is subject to a special motion 
to dismiss, motion for judgment on the pleadings, or motion for summary 
judgment that shall be considered by the court on a priority or expedited 
basis to ensure the early consideration of the issues raised by the motion 
and to prevent the unnecessary expense of litigation.151 
This subsection is the key provision of the New Mexico statute, and 
notably, it does not set forth any rule of substantive law.152  Instead, it 
merely “tells the trial court to hurry up and decide dispositive pretrial 
motions” in frivolous SLAPPs and “creates a right to expeditious trial and 
appellate process.”153  Thus, the Los Lobos decision hinged on the unique 
and narrow language of the New Mexico anti-SLAPP statute.  Because the 
statute is purely a “procedural mechanism for vindicating existing rights,” 
its use in federal court would conflict with the Erie doctrine’s requirement 
that federal law sitting in diversity apply federal procedural law.154 
 
resolution of questions about how the procedural aspects of other states’ anti-SLAPP statutes work in 
federal court will have to await some other case.”  Id. at 732.   
 148. 885 F.3d 659, 673 (10th Cir. 2018) (“A plain reading of the New Mexico anti-SLAPP statute 
reveals the statute is not designed to influence the outcome of an alleged SLAPP suit but only the 
timing of that outcome.”). 
 149. 355 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1057 (D. Kan. 2018) (“The Tenth Circuit’s decision concerned only 
New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP statute which, the court noted, was unlike many other states’ anti-SLAPP 
statutes.  The court’s holding is therefore not binding on whether this court can apply the Kansas Act 
in a federal diversity action.”). 
 150. Id. at 1061. 
 151. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(A) (West, Westlaw through 2020 ch. 84 of 2d Reg. Sess.).  
 152. Los Lobos, 885 F.3d at 669.  
 153. Id. at 669, 666. 
 154. Id. at 668–69 (“Fortunately, we need not rely on any complex Erie analysis here because, 
assuming one is able to read, drawing the line between procedure and substance in this case is hardly 
a ‘challenging endeavor.’  The plain language of the New Mexico anti-SLAPP statute reveals the law 
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Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has reached divergent decisions regarding 
the applicability of two states’ anti-SLAPP statutes.  In Klocke v. Watson, 
the Fifth Circuit found that the Texas anti-SLAPP statute was not 
applicable in federal diversity actions because it directly conflicted with 
the Federal Rules.155  In contrast, in cases involving the Louisiana anti-
SLAPP statute, the Fifth Circuit has found that there is no “Erie 
problem.”156  The Fifth Circuit reached this determination after finding 
that the Texas statute “imposes higher and more complex preliminary 
burdens on the motion to dismiss process and imposes rigorous procedural 
deadlines.”157  These higher burdens include a burden-shifting framework 
that the Fifth Circuit determined “answers the same questions” as Federal 
Rules 12 and 56, as well as requirements demanding “judicial weighing of 
evidence.”158  But, the court reasoned that the Louisiana statute’s less 
rigorous requirements—which place the same burden on a nonmovant in 
opposing the anti-SLAPP special motion as on a nonmovant opposing a 
motion for summary judgment—create less tension between the federal 
and state rules.159  These distinctions led the Fifth Circuit to determine that 
the tension “between the Texas law and the Federal Rules is manifest, 
while the comparable conflict between the Federal Rules and Louisiana 
law is less obvious.”160  Lastly, the Ninth Circuit has found that the 
California anti-SLAPP statute161 is applicable in federal diversity 
actions.162  The Ninth Circuit has the most robust body of case law 
addressing this issue, beginning in 1999 with United States ex rel. 
Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.163  The Ninth Circuit’s case 
law warrants its own discussion. 
 
is nothing more than a procedural mechanism designed to expedite the disposal of frivolous lawsuits 
aimed at threatening free speech rights.”).  
 155. 936 F.3d 240, 245 (5th Cir. 2019).  
 156. Lozovyy v. Kurtz, 813 F.3d 576, 582 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, 
LLC, 566 F.3d 164, 168–69 (2009)); see also Block v. Tanenhaus, 815 F.3d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(“[W]e assume that [the Louisiana anti-SLAPP statute] does apply, and reject [the plaintiff’s] 
argument that, because it provides a stricter standard than Rule 56, it does not apply in federal court.  
It provides the same standard as Rule 56; thus, there is no conflict on that basis.”). 
 157. Klocke, 936 F.3d at 248.   
 158. Id. at 245–46.  
 159. Id. at 249 (citing Block, 815 F.3d at 221).  
 160. Id. at 248–49.   
 161. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 425.16 (Deering 2019).  
 162. See United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 973 
(9th Cir. 1999). 
 163. Id. 
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D. The Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit first held that the California anti-SLAPP statute may 
apply in federal court in its 1999 United States ex rel. Newsham v. 
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. decision.164  There, the court concluded 
that although Federal Rules 12 and 56 served similar purposes to the 
California anti-SLAPP statute, there was no “direct collision” because the 
relevant provisions of the California anti-SLAPP statute promoted 
substantive interests.165  The court found that the “twin aims” of the Erie 
doctrine—the discouragement of forum shopping and promoting the 
equitable administration of justice—were best served by applying the 
California anti-SLAPP statute in federal court.166  The court reasoned that 
the “‘special motion to strike’ adds an additional, unique weapon to the 
pretrial arsenal, a weapon whose sting is enhanced” by allowing a SLAPP 
defendant to recover fees and costs.167  And, the court cautioned, a failure 
to apply the California anti-SLAPP statute in federal court would give a 
plaintiff a “significant incentive to shop for a federal forum,” while giving 
a SLAPP defendant a “considerable disadvantage”—an outcome that 
“run[s] squarely against the ‘twin aims’ of the Erie doctrine.”168  Although 
the Ninth Circuit still allows the California anti-SLAPP statute to apply in 
federal court, it has since released a string of opinions that indicate an 
attempt to restrict the scope of the statute’s applicability in federal 
diversity actions.169 
In 2001, the Ninth Circuit held in Metabolife International Inc. v. 
Wornick that two provisions of the California anti-SLAPP statute did not 
apply in federal diversity actions because they conflicted with the Federal 
Rules.170  These two provisions provided that the anti-SLAPP motion may 
be filed within sixty days of filing the complaint or, at the court’s 
discretion, at any later date,171 and that the filing of an anti-SLAPP motion 
automatically stays all further discovery until the court rules on the 
 
 164. Id. at 973. 
 165. Id. at 972.  
 166. Id. at 973.   
 167. Id.  
 168. Id.  
 169. See Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 845–47 (9th Cir. 2001); Makaeff v. 
Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 272–75 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., concurring); Planned 
Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 832–35 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 1446 (2019). 
 170. 264 F.3d at 846 (quoting Rogers v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 973, 982 
(C.D. Cal. 1999)). 
 171. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 425.16(f) (Deering 2019).  
2020] GETTING SLAPP HAPPY 811 
motion, unless the court specified discovery for good cause shown.172  The 
Ninth Circuit found that, “[t]ogether, these two subsections ‘create a 
default rule that allows the defendant served with a complaint to 
immediately put the plaintiff to his or her proof before the plaintiff can 
conduct discovery,’” whereas Federal Rule 56 does not limit discovery.173  
The court stated: 
 Section 425.16 limits discovery and makes further discovery an 
exception, rather than the rule.  Rule 56 does not limit discovery.  On the 
contrary, it ensures that adequate discovery will occur before summary 
judgment is considered. 
 Because the discovery-limiting aspects of § 425.16(f) and (g) collide 
with the discovery-allowing aspects of Rule 56, these aspects of 
subsections (f) and (g) cannot apply in federal court.174 
By imposing these limits, Metabolife became the first Ninth Circuit case 
to begin circumscribing the scope of the California anti-SLAPP statute in 
federal diversity actions. 
Several years later, in Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC, the Ninth 
Circuit again returned to the question of the applicability of the California 
anti-SLAPP statute in federal diversity actions.175  In Makaeff, the Ninth 
Circuit overturned the district court’s denial of a plaintiff’s motion to 
strike.176  The decision included what has become a very influential 
concurrence by then-Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, creating some 
uncertainty about the future of the California anti-SLAPP statute’s 
applicability in federal diversity actions.177  In his concurrence, Judge 
Kozinski explicitly stated that Newsham “was a big mistake” and “is 
wrong and should be reconsidered” because “the [California] anti-SLAPP 
statute creates no substantive rights; it merely provides a procedural 
mechanism for vindicating existing rights.”178  He asserted that the Federal 
Rules “provide an integrated program of pre-trial, trial and post-trial 
 
 172. Id. § 425.16(g). 
 173. Metabolife, 264 F.3d at 846 (quoting Rogers, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 980).  
 174. Id. (quoting Rogers, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 982).  
 175. 715 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 176. Id. at 271–72. 
 177. See, e.g., Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1335–36 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(“[W]e agree with Judge Kozinski and Judge Watford that [Godin, Henry, and Newsham] are 
ultimately not persuasive.” (citing Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 275 (Kozinski, J., concurring); Makaeff v. 
Trump Univ., LLC, 736 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2013) (Watford, J., dissenting))); Klocke v. Watson, 
936 F.3d 240, 247 (5th Cir. 2019) (endorsing Judge Kozinski’s characterization of the California anti-
SLAPP law as a purely procedural statute that creates no substantive rights and stating that his 
characterization “pertains equally” to the Texas anti-SLAPP law). 
 178. Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 272–75 (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
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procedures designed to . . . follow a logical order and pace so that cases 
proceed smartly towards final judgment or settlement,” and that 
application of the California statute “cuts an ugly gash through this orderly 
process.”179  His fiery concurrence has since been referenced by other 
courts that have decided not to apply anti-SLAPP statutes in federal 
diversity actions.180  Further, the Ninth Circuit has subsequently appeared 
more willing to adopt Judge Kozinski’s reasoning and restrict the scope of 
the statute’s applicability. 
The most recent Ninth Circuit case to address the issue is Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Center for Medical Progress, 
which further narrowed the applicability of the California anti-SLAPP 
statute.181  There, the plaintiffs sued the defendants in federal court, 
alleging that the defendants fraudulently entered Planned Parenthood staff 
conferences and meetings to create fabricated and deceptive videos that 
were then posted online.182  The defendants moved to dismiss under 
Federal Rule 12(b)(6) and under the California anti-SLAPP statute.183  The 
district court denied both motions, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.184  In 
reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied on its prior analysis in 
Metabolife, where the court held that some portions of California’s anti-
SLAPP law—the automatic stay of discovery and the time requirements—
conflict with the Federal Rules.185  The Ninth Circuit decided that it would 
apply different standards of review to anti-SLAPP motions to strike 
depending on the basis of the motion “to prevent the collision of California 
state procedural rules with federal procedural rules.”186  The court adopted 
the following language from a prior unpublished opinion: 
If a defendant makes an anti-SLAPP motion to strike founded on purely 
legal arguments, then the analysis is made under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and 
12 standards; if it is a factual challenge, then the motion must be treated 
as though it were a motion for summary judgment and discovery must 
be permitted.187 
Metabolife and Center for Medical Progress, taken together, suggest that 
a plaintiff need not put forth prima facie evidence supporting its claims if 
 
 179. Id. at 274.  
 180. See, e.g., Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 247 (5th Cir. 2019); Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., 
LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1335–36 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 181. 890 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1446 (2019). 
 182. Id. at 829. 
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 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 833–34 (citing Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 840–46 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 186. Id. at 833. 
 187. Id. (quoting Z.F. v. Ripon Unified Sch. Dist., 482 F. App’x 239, 240 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
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a defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion is based on a complaint’s legal 
deficiencies.188  Without accompanying discovery, this requirement 
“would improperly transform the motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP 
law into a motion for summary judgment without providing any of the 
procedural safeguards that have been firmly established by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.”189  Looking to the basis of the motion to 
determine the appropriate standard of review when analyzing anti-SLAPP 
motions to strike would allow the anti-SLAPP protections to remain in 
place while maintaining the procedural safeguards established by the 
Federal Rules. 
E. The U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas 
Unlike the Ninth Circuit’s well-developed case law regarding the 
California anti-SLAPP statute, only one case has discussed the Kansas 
anti-SLAPP statute’s applicability in federal diversity actions.190  In 2018, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas decided Caranchini v. 
Peck, where the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute’s applicability in federal court 
was a question of first impression.191  In evaluating the statute’s 
applicability, the court determined that the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute 
governed both substance and procedure.192  After quickly deciding that the 
Tenth Circuit’s Los Lobos decision did not control, the court turned to 
additional circuit court analyses of other state anti-SLAPP statutes.193  The 
court focused primarily on the First Circuit’s opinion in Godin v. 
Schencks194 and the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Abbas v. Foreign Policy 
Group, LLC,195 because the state statutes at issue in those cases have 
similar burden shifting frameworks to the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute.196  
The court agreed with the First Circuit that “the application of the anti-
SLAPP statute in federal diversity actions would best serve the ‘twin aims 
for the Erie rule: discouragement of forum shopping and inequitable 
administration of the laws.’”197  The court reasoned that a failure to apply 
the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute would ignore the Kansas legislature’s 
desire to provide additional protection to SLAPP defendants, and therefore 
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 189. Id. at 833–34. 
 190. See Caranchini v. Peck, 355 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (D. Kan. 2018). 
 191. Id. at 1057. 
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 193. Id. at 1057–60. 
 194. 629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 195. 783 F.3d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 196. Caranchini, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 1058–61. 
 197. Id. at 1060 (quoting Godin, 629 F.3d at 91). 
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concluded that applying the statute in federal diversity actions was most 
consistent with the Erie doctrine’s purposes.198  The court found that, 
although procedural in nature, the statute “exist[s] to influence substantive 
outcomes, and . . . is so bound up with the state-created right or remedy 
that it defines the scope of that substantive right or remedy.”199  The U.S. 
District Court for the District of Kansas expressed confidence that the 
Tenth Circuit would agree with this outcome based on dicta in Los Lobos 
suggesting that burden-shifting provisions in anti-SLAPP statutes “are 
more substantive in nature . . . and are [therefore] more likely to apply in 
federal diversity actions.”200  The court also asserted that it did not find the 
reasoning in Abbas persuasive, because it disagreed with the D.C. Circuit’s 
view that the D.C. statute is “very procedural in nature” since it “creates a 
mechanism for a defendant to resolve the case pre-trial, much like Rules 
12 and 56.”201  The Caranchini court also found that the D.C. Circuit 
should have discussed the “practical effects” of failing to apply the anti-
SLAPP statutes in federal diversity actions.202  Thus, after evaluating the 
Godin and Abbas decisions, the court concluded that applying the Kansas 
anti-SLAPP statute in federal court “is the result that is most consistent 
with the purposes of the Erie doctrine.”203 
III. ANALYSIS 
The sole case from the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas 
addressing the applicability of Kansas’s anti-SLAPP statute in federal 
court lacks the depth of the more well-developed Ninth Circuit case law.  
As the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas continues to develop 
its approach on this issue, it should follow the Ninth Circuit’s recent efforts 
to circumscribe select procedural provisions of the state anti-SLAPP 
statute, while continuing to apply its substantive provisions, because this 
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 199. Id. at 1061 (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 
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best aligns with the purposes of the Erie doctrine.  This Part will consider 
the similarities between the California and Kansas anti-SLAPP statutes, 
describe how circumscribing only the procedural provisions of the Kansas 
statute aligns with the Erie doctrine and its goals, and conclude by 
evaluating the implications of adopting the Ninth Circuit’s approach. 
A. The Kansas Anti-SLAPP Statute Is Similar to Its California 
Counterpart 
The Kansas and California anti-SLAPP statutes contain many 
strikingly similar provisions.  This Section discusses the similarities 
between the two statutes’ stated purposes and the protected activities that 
they cover. 
1. The Stated Purposes Are Similar 
The Kansas anti-SLAPP statute’s language more closely resembles 
the broad language of the California anti-SLAPP statute than some of the 
more narrow provisions found in several other state statutes.  The Kansas 
statute is designed to “encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of 
a person to petition, and speak freely and associate freely, in connection 
with a public issue or issue of public interest.”204  Similarly, the California 
statute’s stated purpose is to protect an individual’s “right of petition or 
free speech under the United States Constitution . . . in connection with a 
public issue.”205  The California legislature elaborated even further, stating 
at the statute’s outset: 
The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing 
increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the 
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of 
grievances.  The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public 
interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public 
significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through 
abuse of the judicial process.  To this end, this section shall be construed 
broadly.206 
The Kansas legislature did not elaborate as extensively as the California 
legislature, but the Kansas statute similarly directs courts to “appl[y] and 
construe[]” its provisions “liberally to effectuate its general purposes.”207 
 
 204. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5320(b) (West 2016 & Supp. 2019).  
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 206. Id. § 425.16(a) (emphasis added). 
 207. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5320(k); see also Jana S. Baker & Victoria L. Vish, The Burgeoning 
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2. The Kansas and California Statutes Apply to a Similar Array of 
Protected Activities 
The Kansas and California anti-SLAPP statutes both provide 
safeguards for a similar range of constitutionally protected activities.  The 
Kansas statute provides an extensive list of the communications that fall 
under the statute’s protection, including a wide variety of communications 
pertaining to judicial, official, executive, legislative, and various other 
types of proceedings.208  Similarly, California’s statute protects acts 
conducted “in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech,” 
including written or oral statements concerning legislative, executive, 
judicial, or any other official proceedings, as well as any “statement or 
writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection 
with an issue of public interest.”209  Lastly, the California statute, like 
Kansas, provides for the recovery of attorney’s fees and litigation costs of 
a party that wins a motion to dismiss under the statute.210 
Although the text of the California and Kansas anti-SLAPP statutes 
closely resemble each other, the Public Participation Project (the 
“Project”)—a prominent organization heavily involved in First 
Amendment advocacy that advocates for heightened free speech 
protection—gives the California statute an “excellent” rating and the 
Kansas statute a “good” rating.211  On the Project’s “State Anti-SLAPP 
Scorecard” the California statute has a letter grade of “A,” (which 
corresponds to an “excellent” rating) whereas the Kansas statute was given 
a letter grade of “B,” (which corresponds to a “good” rating).212  However, 
comparing the Kansas statute with state statutes that are considered 
“adequate” or “weak” by the Project and have letter grades of “C” or “D,” 
respectively, illustrates how the Kansas statute much more closely 
resembles the California statute.  For example, the Arizona anti-SLAPP 
statute has an “adequate” rating with a “C” letter grade because it protects 
 
Use of “Strong” Anti-SLAPP Statutes in Employment Law, OGLETREE DEAKINS (Mar. 6, 2019), 
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(quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.011(b) (West, Westlaw current through 2019 Reg. 
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a narrower range of activities.213  The Arizona statute protects an 
individual’s right to petition; but, unlike the Kansas and California 
statutes, the phrase “exercise of the right of petition” is limited only to 
statements that are either “made as part of an initiative, referendum or 
recall effort,” or statements that are made before a governmental body or 
proceeding, connected to “an issue that is under consideration or review,” 
and “[m]ade for the purpose of influencing a governmental action, 
decision or result.”214  Thus, a defendant can only challenge a lawsuit as a 
SLAPP under the Arizona statute if the defendant made or submitted the 
statement in one of these two specific instances.215  Several other states 
that received lower ratings from the Project have similar restrictions and 
narrow protective scopes.216 
B. The Erie Doctrine Requires Application of the Kansas Anti-SLAPP 
Statute in Federal Court 
As discussed above, the Erie doctrine is a complex area of law that 
has evolved significantly since its inception in 1938.217  Despite its 
complexity, the current doctrine provides some guidance to courts 
attempting to resolve the tension between the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute 
and the Federal Rules.  In determining whether a state law may apply in 
federal diversity actions, courts first assess whether the Constitution or any 
federal statute, treaty, or Federal Rule applies—and if so, this law 
controls.218  When an apparent conflict exists between state and a Federal 
Rule, courts consider whether the Federal Rule can be construed narrowly 
so as to avoid conflict with the state rule.219  If the conflict cannot be 
avoided by narrow construction, then the court considers whether the 
choice between federal and state law would be outcome-determinative 
under Guaranty Trust.220  The court should here consider the “twin aims” 
of Erie to see if a failure to apply the state law would result in forum 
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shopping or an inequitable administration of the laws.221  If the choice of 
law would not influence the outcome of the case, then the federal law 
would control, but if the choice would be outcome-determinative, the court 
looks to the test articulated in Byrd to see if any important countervailing 
federal interest exists that would require the application of federal law.222  
A substantive state law will apply in federal diversity actions unless there 
is a “federal policy favoring” the Federal Rule,223 because even when the 
state statute presumptively applies, Byrd allows a Federal Rule to still 
trump the state law if there is an important federal policy at stake.224  But, 
federal courts should supplant state law only as much as is necessary to 
maintain the essential characteristics of the federal system.225  Following 
this analysis, as demonstrated below, would lead a court to determine that 
applying the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute’s substantive provisions in 
federal diversity actions serves Erie’s purpose of promoting federal and 
state interests. 
1. A Narrow Construction of the Federal Rules Alleviates Any Existing 
Tension with the Kansas Statute 
The Erie doctrine requires federal courts sitting in diversity to apply 
the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute.  To determine whether a state law may 
apply in federal diversity actions, courts must assess whether the 
Constitution or any federal statute, treaty, or Federal Rule applies—and if 
so, this law controls.226  When an apparent conflict exists between a state 
law and a Federal Rule, courts consider whether the Federal Rule can be 
construed narrowly so as to avoid conflict with the state rule.227 
Federal Rules 8, 12, and 56 can be construed narrowly so as to avoid 
conflict with most provisions in the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute, because 
the Kansas statute governs only narrow factual situations where a 
defendant is defending its First Amendment right to petition.  The Kansas 
statute allows a defendant to bring early motions to strike claims based on, 
related to, or brought “in response to a party’s exercise of the right of free 
speech, right to petition or right of association.”228  In such cases, the 
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statute requires a plaintiff to put forth a heightened showing that it could 
prevail.229  If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the claims must be 
dismissed.230  Federal Rules 8, 12, and 56 govern the pleading and pretrial 
dismissal procedure in federal civil suits, but these Federal Rules can 
coexist with the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute because the Kansas statute 
seeks to advance a substantive policy of protecting free speech, a goal that 
is nowhere mentioned in the Federal Rules.  As Justice Ginsburg asserted 
in Shady Grove, a federal court hearing a diversity case can, and should, 
“accord due respect to both state and federal prescriptions,” because the 
“Erie jurisprudence . . . counsels [the Court] to read Federal Rules 
moderately and cautions against stretching a Rule to cover every situation 
it could conceivably reach.”231  Although Federal Rules 8, 12, and 56 could 
be stretched to conceivably reach every situation covered by the Kansas 
statute, the Federal Rules still fail to provide the substantive First 
Amendment protections afforded to individuals by the Kansas statute.   
When tasked with resolving the apparent conflict between the Federal 
Rules and the Kansas statute, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Kansas, and ultimately the Tenth Circuit, should adopt the approach that 
the Ninth Circuit took in Center for Medical Progress.  There, to alleviate 
the tension between the Federal Rules and the California anti-SLAPP 
statute, the Ninth Circuit decided to review anti-SLAPP motions to 
dismiss under two different standards depending on the motion’s basis.  
The court stated that when an anti-SLAPP motion to strike is “founded on 
purely legal arguments, then the analysis is made under [Federal Rules] 8 
and 12 standards; if it is a factual challenge, then the motion must be 
treated as though it were a motion for summary judgment and discovery 
must be permitted.”232  But, if the motion to strike is “based on alleged 
deficiencies in the plaintiff’s complaint, the motion must be treated in the 
same manner as a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) except that the attorney’s 
fee provision of § 425.16(c) applies.”233  Thus, if an anti-SLAPP motion 
to dismiss is brought challenging a complaint’s legal sufficiency, a federal 
court should evaluate the motion using the pleading requirements found in 
Federal Rules 8 and 12.  But, if the motion challenges a complaint’s factual 
basis, then the court should evaluate it as a Federal Rule 56 summary 
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judgment motion and allow for appropriate discovery.  This result would 
be in line with the guidelines set out in the Kansas statute.234  The Ninth 
Circuit’s construction squares with the federal courts’ responsibility to 
interpret the Federal Rules “with sensitivity to important state interests and 
regulatory policies”235 by applying the Federal Rules narrowly so as to 
avoid conflict with the provisions in the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute. 
2. Allowing the Substantive Provisions of the Kansas Statute to Apply 
in Diversity Actions Promotes State Interests 
If the Kansas statute did not apply in federal diversity actions, this 
would give plaintiffs a choice between federal and state law that would be 
considered outcome-determinative under Guaranty Trust.236  This choice 
is outcome-determinative if a plaintiff would perceive she would receive 
different outcomes in her case if federal law was applied instead of the 
state law.  If the plaintiff would perceive no difference in her case under 
either law, then the federal law should apply.  Here, a plaintiff bringing a 
SLAPP would undoubtedly choose the federal forum if the Kansas anti-
SLAPP statute did not apply to her case.  Therefore, the applicability of 
the Kansas statute must be assessed in light of the “twin aims” of Erie—
“discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable 
administration of the laws.”237  Failure to apply the clearly substantive 
provisions of the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute would lead to inequitable 
administration of justice between a party’s options in state and federal 
court.  Equitable administration of the laws compels federal courts sitting 
in diversity to apply the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute, because a contrary 
result would require a federal court to ignore the additional protections 
enacted by the Kansas legislature when applying Kansas defamation laws 
solely by virtue of “the accident of diversity of citizenship.”238  The Erie 
rule is founded on the principle that the result of litigation should not be 
different just because a case is brought in federal court.239  In declining to 
apply the statute, a federal court would “ignor[e] the Kansas legislature’s 
desire to protect individuals against defamation lawsuits that infringe on 
[their] First Amendment rights” and defy the power of the legislature “to 
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create additional rules that govern its laws and causes of action.”240  This 
would leave a federal SLAPP defendant unable to invoke the additional 
protections envisioned by the Kansas legislature when it enacted the 
statute, a result that leads to an inequitable administration of the laws. 
Allowing a defendant to invoke the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute in 
federal diversity actions discourages forum shopping by subjecting parties 
to the same law in both forums.  Failure to apply the Kansas anti-SLAPP 
statute in federal diversity actions would frustrate Erie’s purpose of 
discouraging forum shopping because a party bringing its lawsuit in 
federal court would be able to avoid the burden-shifting provisions in the 
statute as well as evade liability for the defendant’s attorney’s fees, as is 
provided under the statute.241  Therefore, because a plaintiff’s choice of 
forum would be influenced depending on the applicability of the statute, 
the Kansas statute should be uniformly applied in both state and federal 
courts.242 
However, a few provisions in the Kansas statute, such as the stay on 
discovery and the timeliness requirements, appear purely procedural.243  
Therefore, federal courts sitting in diversity need not apply these few 
specific statutory provisions.  Later sections will discuss these procedural 
provisions and explore how the Ninth Circuit’s case law on this issue may 
provide guidance to courts confronting these provisions in the Kansas anti-
SLAPP statute.244 
3. No Sufficiently Important Federal Interests Exist That Would 
Prohibit Application of the Kansas Statute in Federal Court 
Once the choice between federal and state law is deemed outcome-
determinative, under Byrd the court asks if any important countervailing 
federal interest exists that would require the application of federal law.245  
A substantive state law will apply in federal diversity actions unless there 
 
 240. Caranchini v. Peck, 355 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1060 (D. Kan. 2018).  
 241. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5320(g)(1) (West 2016 & Supp. 2019). 
 242. See Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 2010) (“Declining to apply [the Maine anti-
SLAPP statute] in federal court would thus result in an inequitable administration of justice between 
a defense asserted in state court and the same defense asserted in federal court.  Likewise, were [the 
Maine statute] not to apply in federal court, the incentives for forum shopping would be strong: 
electing to bring state-law claims in federal as opposed to state court would allow a plaintiff to avoid 
[the statute]’s burden-shifting framework, rely upon the common law’s per se damages rule, and 
circumvent any liability for a defendant’s attorney’s fees or costs.”). 
 243. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5320(d), (e)(2). 
 244. See infra Section III.C.  
 245. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958); see also supra Section 
II.C.1.  
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is a “federal policy favoring” the Federal Rule,246 because even when the 
state statute presumptively applies, Byrd allows a Federal Rule to still 
trump the state law if there is an important federal policy at stake.247  But, 
federal courts should supplant state law only as much as is necessary to 
maintain the essential characteristics of the federal system.248  Although 
federal courts have an interest in promoting uniformity, this interest does 
not outweigh Kansas’s interest in providing additional protection for 
individuals facing meritless SLAPP suits for exercising their First 
Amendment rights.  As one author asserted, federalism principles and First 
Amendment rights afforded to individuals “outweigh the generalized 
interest in uniformity of federal procedure, especially when such 
uniformity in procedure has the potential to create disuniformity in 
outcome by undermining state law protections for legitimate petitioning 
activity.”249  Therefore, courts facing this question should not find that any 
countervailing federal interests are strong enough to outweigh application 
of the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute in federal diversity actions. 
C. The U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas Should Imitate the 
Ninth Circuit’s Recent Restrictions and Employ Only the Substantive 
Provisions in Federal Diversity Actions 
In Caranchini v. Peck, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Kansas found that the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute did not create a 
substitute for Rules 12 and 56, but “merely supplement[ed] them for a 
narrow category of cases.”250  However, the court noted in dicta it was “not 
convinced that the requirement that a court hold a hearing within 30 days 
and the mandatory discovery stay provisions are applicable in federal 
diversity actions, as those provisions are strictly procedural in nature and 
do not affect the outcome of the case.”251  The court, however, did not 
reach any conclusions on this point because neither party raised the 
issue.252  In future cases that do raise this issue, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Kansas should look to the Ninth Circuit’s string of decisions 
that discuss the variances between the California anti-SLAPP statute’s 
procedural and substantive provisions. 
 
 246. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538.  
 247. Id.  
 248. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 431 (1996). 
 249. Quinlan, supra note 55, at 403.   
 250. Caranchini v. Peck, 355 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1061 (D. Kan. 2018).  
 251. Id. (citing Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 845–46 (9th Cir. 2001)).  
 252. Id. 
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1. The Timeliness Requirements 
United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.253 
was the first Ninth Circuit case to find no direct conflict between the 
Federal Rules and the California anti-SLAPP statute’s provisions offering 
defendants a special motion to strike254 and the availability of fees and 
costs.255  But Newsham did not address the rest of the California anti-
SLAPP statute.256  Two years later, the Ninth Circuit found that the 
discovery restrictions in the California anti-SLAPP statute conflict with 
the “discovery-allowing aspects” of Federal Rule 56, and therefore those 
provisions of the California statute could not apply in federal court.257  The 
Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion again in Center for Medical 
Progress regarding the applicability of the statute’s timing requirements 
in federal proceedings.258  This is one of the ways the Ninth Circuit has 
placed restrictions on the scope of the California anti-SLAPP statute in 
federal court. 
Kansas’s anti-SLAPP statute includes a strikingly similar provision.  
Subsection (d) states “[t]he motion to strike made under this subsection 
may be filed within 60 days of the service of the most recent complaint,” 
and “[a] hearing shall be held on the motion not more than 30 days after 
the service of the motion.”259  The court in Caranchini v. Peck did not rule 
on the applicability of this provision because it was not raised as an 
issue.260  When presented with this issue, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Kansas should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Metabolife 
and Center for Medical Progress and determine that this provision is a 
purely procedural mechanism, and therefore not applicable in federal 
diversity actions. 
2. The Automatic Stay on Discovery 
Another provision of the California statute that the Ninth Circuit 
determined inapplicable in federal court is the automatic stay on discovery.  
The Metabolife court explained that district courts in the Ninth Circuit 
have found that an automatic stay conflicts with the Rule 56 summary 
 
 253. 190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 254. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b) (Deering 2019). 
 255. Id. § 425.16(c). 
 256. Metabolife, 264 F.3d at 845–46. 
 257. Rogers v. Home Shopping Network, 57 F. Supp. 2d 973, 982 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
 258. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 833–35 (9th Cir. 
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1446 (2019). 
 259. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5320(d) (West 2016 & Supp. 2019).  
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judgment requirements, and therefore is inapplicable in federal court.261  
The court reasoned that the provisions limiting discovery in the California 
statute collide with the “discovery-allowing aspect of Rule 56” and 
therefore cannot apply in federal diversity actions.262 
Other courts have similarly found the discovery-limiting provisions in 
other states’ anti-SLAPP statutes inapplicable in federal diversity actions.  
For example, in 2015, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota 
held that the Minnesota anti-SLAPP law “collides head-on” with Federal 
Rule 56.263  The court found that the restrictive standard for discovery 
under the Minnesota anti-SLAPP statute is “oil to the water of Rule 56’s 
more permissive standard.”264  The Minnesota statute suspended discovery 
pending the motion’s final disposition, “provided that the court may, on 
motion and after a hearing and for good cause shown, order that specified 
and limited discovery be conducted.”265  The court concluded that because 
Rule 56 did not place the same “hurdle in the path of a party seeking” 
discovery to avoid pretrial dismissal of its well-pleaded claims, it would 
not apply the discovery rule in Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP law.266 
The Kansas statute also provides for a discovery stay: 
[A]ll discovery, motions or other pending hearings shall be stayed upon 
the filing of the motion to strike.  The stay of discovery shall remain in 
effect until the entry of the order ruling on the motion except that the 
court, on motion and for good cause shown, may order that specified 
discovery, motions or other pending hearings be conducted.267 
This provision, much like the discovery-limiting provisions of the 
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California and the Minnesota statutes, likely conflicts with Federal Rule 
56 in such a way that even a narrow construction of Rule 56 would fail to 
alleviate the tension. 
Although the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute’s substantive provisions—
the special motion to strike and the availability of attorney’s fees and 
costs—should remain applicable in federal diversity actions, the timing 
requirements and the automatic stay on discovery likely create an 
unresolvable tension with the Federal Rules.  The strictly procedural 
provisions of the Kansas statute should therefore not apply in federal court.  
When presented with this question, the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Kansas—and ultimately the Tenth Circuit—should accordingly adopt 
the reasoning from the Ninth Circuit’s Metabolife and Center for Medical 
Progress cases and determine that the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute’s timing 
and discovery-limiting provisions do not apply in federal diversity actions 
because they are purely procedural mechanisms.  This result preserves the 
statute’s integrity by allowing its key provisions to remain applicable 
while also avoiding an Erie conflict.  In fact, this result best serves Erie’s 
“twin aims” because the substantive provisions remain viable as a 
deterrent to forum shopping and promotes equal administration of the laws 
by ensuring that a defendant may invoke the full protection intended by 
the Kansas legislature. 
3. Implications of Adopting the Ninth Circuit’s Approach 
Adopting the Ninth Circuit’s approach would not result in a complete 
bar of motions brought under the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute in federal 
court.  Federal courts have held, and will likely continue to hold, that 
various provisions of state anti-SLAPP statutes do not conflict with the 
Federal Rules, and therefore apply in federal diversity actions.268 
For example, the Second Circuit addressed the applicability of various 
provisions of the Nevada anti-SLAPP statute in a similar fashion.269  The 
court stated that the provisions granting immunity from civil liability and 
the mandatory fee shifting seemed “unproblematic” because these 
provisions: “(1) would apply in state court had suit been filed there; (2) is 
substantive within the meaning of Erie, since it is consequential enough 
that enforcement in federal proceedings will serve to discourage forum 
shopping and avoid inequity; and (3) does not squarely conflict with a 
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valid federal rule.”270  However, the court suggested the discovery-barring 
provision may have presented a “closer question.”271  The Second Circuit 
ultimately avoided having to resolve the question, though its discussion 
suggests that it would be willing to decline to apply antidiscovery 
provisions in state anti-SLAPP statutes.272 
A few federal district courts have adopted the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach.273  The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
recently adopted the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, finding that the Ninth 
Circuit’s “manner of harmonizing the Federal Rules and California’s anti-
SLAPP statute is entirely sensible.”274  The court agreed with the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Center for Medical Progress that “if an anti-SLAPP 
motion challenges the ‘legal sufficiency’ of a claim, then a federal district 
court should apply Rule 12(b)(6) standards; and if the motion challenges 
the ‘factual sufficiency’ of the claim, then the court should apply Rule 56 
standards (including opportunity for discovery).”275  This allows a court to 
look past all of the “procedural fencing” by finding a defendant “has 
essentially filed an early summary-judgment motion on a limited 
record.”276  The court noted that the anti-SLAPP statutes merely “puts 
some extra skin in the game” because if the defendant wins its motion, it 
can recover attorney’s fees and costs, but if the defendant files a frivolous 
motion, the plaintiff recovers fees.277 
In the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, this would mean 
that the burden-shifting provision found in subsection (d) of the Kansas 
statute would continue to apply in federal diversity actions.  The statute 
provides that a defendant bringing the special motion to strike has the 
initial burden of demonstrating that they were exercising their right of free 
speech, right to petition, or right of association.278  If the defendant meets 
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its burden, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff “to establish a likelihood 
of prevailing on the claim by presenting substantial competent evidence to 
support a prima facie case.”279  If the plaintiff can satisfy its burden, the 
defendant’s motion will be denied.280 
Similarly, the provision allowing recovering attorney’s fees would 
remain applicable.  The timing requirements found in subsection (d),281 
however, would not apply in federal court, nor would the discovery-
limiting provisions found in subsections (e)(1)–(2).282  This result does not 
pose a problem, because subsection (k) provides that the statute “shall be 
applied and construed liberally to effectuate its general purposes,” and that 
if a court finds any part of the statute inapplicable, the remaining 
provisions continue to apply.283  The statute’s text therefore also supports 
adopting the Ninth Circuit’s approach of circumscribing only select 
provisions while continuing to apply the substantive protections afforded 
to defendants. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The substantive provisions of the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute can be 
construed to work together with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The 
Kansas anti-SLAPP statute is designed to guide the substantive standards 
that determine when First Amendment petitioning activity can receive 
heightened protections.  The Kansas anti-SLAPP law must therefore be 
understood as supplementing––rather than supplanting––the Federal 
Rules.  When presented with this question in the future, the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Kansas—and ultimately, the Tenth Circuit—
should circumscribe only select portions of the anti-SLAPP statute in 
federal diversity actions, while continuing to apply the substantive 
provisions.  This outcome best protects SLAPP defendants while also 
aligning with the purposes of the Erie doctrine.  This result will serve both 
federal and state interests, discourage forum shopping, promote the 
equitable administration of the laws, and most importantly, provide 
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SLAPP defendants the full protection the Kansas legislature envisioned 
when drafting the Kansas anti-SLAPP statute. 
 
